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N A B I L  A L - T I K R I T I Times are hard for professors in Iraq 
today—very hard. Since the US/UK “co-
alition of the willing” invaded the coun-
try in March 2003 and forcibly evicted 
the country’s sovereign government, 
an estimated 10-15% of Iraq’s 16,500 
instructors spreads across some 20 uni-
versities have left the country. In addi-
tion to facing bitterly disappointed ex-
pectations of US institutional support 
in the past 20 months, professors have 
been forced to cope with widespread 
looting, targeted violence, campus 
politicization, and institutional uncer-
tainty. Although some actors remain 
optimistic about a future for a higher education sector liberated from a 
stifling and highly centralized state control, most remain apprehensive 
about the same sector liberated from sources of funding, professors, 
and campus civility.
Times were not always so bad. Iraq’s universities were a proud part of 
the national patrimony from the 1950’s to the 1980’s, and were widely 
considered among the region’s best throughout this period. Observers 
recall a vibrant and exciting 1970’s, when the university sector engaged 
in international research ventures, published top-flight in the humani-
ties and the sciences, surveyed the country’s unrivalled archaeological 
sites, catalogued Iraq’s impressive manuscript holdings, and sent its best 
graduates to earn Ph.D.’s at the foremost research universities in Europe 
and North America. Many of those internationally educated graduates 
returned home in the 1980’s and provided the scientific expertise need-
ed to build the state’s advanced arms programmes in that time of war. 
Although the growth and elaboration of higher education continued 
through much of the 1980’s, the twin effects of state Saddamization 
and compulsory fiscal restraint during the long and difficult Iran-Iraq 
War began to sap the energy and vibrancy of the universities. By the 
end of the decade, the good times had clearly passed as state monitor-
ing of campus politics began to negatively affect retention of academic 
talent. Yet, by the war’s end education professionals could still hope to 
be optimistic about a long-waited post-war future.
The beginning of the end for Iraqi higher education dates to the gov-
ernment’s ill-advised hostile takeover of Kuwait in 1990. After the in-
ternational community mobilized to enforce the illegality of an unpro-
voked and unsanctioned invasion of one sovereign country by another, 
Iraq found itself facing a crushing sanctions regime and hefty reparation 
requirements vis-a-vis Kuwait. Iraqis initially expected to endure a few 
months of financial difficulty until the UN Security Council disarmament 
protocols could be carried out. Instead, the sanctions regime continued 
for nearly thirteen years, primarily due to US and UK insistence. 
Trapped in a formerly affluent society now forced to prioritize pro-
curement of basic necessities, Iraq’s universities faced gradual decline 
throughout the 1990’s. Higher education suffered not only from inter-
nationally enforced neglect, but the sector also found itself physically 
and intellectually cut off from the rest of the world. Under sanctions, 
international exchanges ended completely, journal subscriptions were 
prohibited, high technology purchases were forbidden, and spare 
parts for previously purchased equipment were halted. Famously, even 
pencils were embargoed due to the “dual use” capability of lead. Com-
bined with the continuing strictures on intellectual curiosity spring-
ing from an increasingly apprehensive 
and insecure authoritarian ruling elite, 
many of the country’s most talented 
academics found the situation un-
bearable and emigrated. An estimated 
10,000 instructors left the country in 
the 1990’s.1 In spite of such adversity, 
those professors who remained man-
aged to maintain academic standards 
through increasingly desperate forms 
of improvisation. For example, in order 
to keep up with scientific advances, 
medical school instructors annually 
obtained from Jordan a single copy 
of relevant medical textbooks, which 
were then provided to photocopiers for class distribution. Although 
scientific research ground to a halt, university instruction continued. 
Looting strips the campuses
The final coup de grace for Iraq’s academe occurred in the chaos 
which followed the fall of the Ba‘athist government in April 2003. Ex-
pressing anger, frustration, and consternation about a suddenly fallen 
state sector, various elements took privatization of government insti-
tutions—like universities—into their own hands with a wave of mass 
lootings. It has been suggested that officials carried out some of the 
looting to erase a contentious past. Although that may be true for sev-
eral sensitive state facilities, the university looters seem to have largely 
consisted of urban poor. While the effect of the looting was spread 
unevenly throughout the country, the damage to many facilities was 
devastating. Various library facilities were looted and/or burned, as 
were much of the holdings of such cultural repositories and research 
institutions as the Baghdad Museum, National Archives, Awqaf Library, 
Iraqi Academy of Sciences, and Bayt al-Hikma. The looting of campus 
offices destroyed much of the institutional memory of Iraq’s universi-
ties. Student records, personnel records, faculty files, and many other 
sorts of records which provide the “nuts and bolts” of education admin-
istration were lost — as they were in so many other sectors.2 To Iraqis, 
the looting of April 2003 was only the most recent act of a long-term 
conspiracy to “keep Iraq down” rather than an unfortunate example of 
“stuff happening” when an authoritarian regime collapses. As one Iraqi 
saying had it when the government fell and the former president dis-
appeared, “now the student has left—and the master has arrived.”
University life in occupied Iraq
Iraqi professors, students, and administrators had reason to hope that 
their situation might improve. Unfortunately, the period following the 
establishment of the US/UK occupation can largely be characterized as 
“one step forward, two steps backward” and has only served to confirm 
Iraqi suspicions concerning US motives. The anticipated reconstruction 
support from US institutions never materialized on a scale capable of 
restoring the tattered glory of Iraq’s universities due partly to policy 
choice, and partly to circumstance. 
The Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research has cal-
culated that $1.2 billion is needed for university rehabilitation. Against 
that need, the ministry has been allocated approximately $20 million in 
benefits from USAID contracts awarded to American universities, and 
$20 million from other international donors.3 Not only is that amount 
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tiny compared to the estimated required amount, it is also a drop in the 
bucket against the $18.6 billion total funds approved by the US Con-
gress for Iraqi reconstruction in November 2003. In one sense, it has 
made little difference—only an estimated 20% of such reconstruction 
funds had been disbursed by June 2004 in any case.4 
From the beginning, US administrators allocated funding in accord-
ance with short term US interests rather than long-term Iraqi interests. 
The Republican party apparatchiks sent by the Bush Administration 
to staff the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) did the best they 
could, but the strictures of neo-conservative policy goals designed to 
“spread democracy” seriously undermined any efforts to remedy the 
situation at hand. For example, it was felt to be of the highest priority 
to ensure that every primary school student in the country received 
new textbooks, complete with USAID-approved re-interpretations of 
Iraqi, Arab, and Islamic history. Combined with a widely-advertised 
initiative to leave no primary or secondary school unpainted, the pre-
university sector received an estimated 7-8 times more funding sup-
port than higher education from the US government and the World 
Bank—betraying a prioritization of the mass indoctrination of Iraqi 
youth through new textbooks over the restoration of Iraq’s regional 
pre-eminence in higher education.5
As with other Iraqi state assets, there was briefly some discussion of 
setting up private “international” educational institutions to compete 
with, and perhaps supplant, state higher education facilities. How-
ever, like so much else that has been envisioned since the spring of 
2003, this idea has yet to materialize beyond a couple of pilot efforts. 
These institutions, the “American Liberal Arts University of Iraq” in Arbil 
and the “College of Democracy,” are both located in Northern Iraq and 
are closely identified with former CPA Higher Education Advisor John 
Agrestos. 
Another priority of US administrators appears to have been provid-
ing corporate welfare to US companies in the form of reconstruction 
contracts. This mode of funding has so far led to a uniquely American 
brand of corporate corruption, whereby US taxpayers pay top dollar 
to US companies for basic jobs like painting primary schools. In turn, 
the US companies hire local subcontractors at pennies on the dollar 
to physically fulfill the contracted work. The leakage implied in such a 
contracting protocol would rival any patronage system of the type rou-
tinely condemned by World Bank and IMF investigators in less wealthy 
societies. Although this sort of structure has been somewhat less in 
evidence in the higher education sector than in other sectors, the over-
all effect has been to bleed the US economy while robbing Iraqis of 
sovereignty over their own institutions. 
One of the most damaging CPA decisions concerning the universi-
ties sprung from the wider US goal of “de-Ba‘athification.” In May 2003, 
newly-appointed CPA head Paul Bremer announced a comprehensive 
policy of de-Ba‘athification for state employees above the middle 
ranks. Even prior to Bremer’s announcement, Iraqi public opinion—and 
a couple of targeted assassinations—forced many unpopular campus 
Ba‘athist apparatchiks into hiding. However, after this wide-ranging de-
cree, public education institutions found themselves robbed of much 
of their best talent, as CPA advisor and education commissar Andrew 
Erdmann oversaw the expulsion of an estimated 1,400 university in-
structors for Ba‘ath party membership.6 Although many of these pro-
fessionals were later rehired, the institutional damage has been con-
siderable.
Research professionals associated with the former government’s 
weapons development programme found themselves detained by US 
officials in prison camps. The most notable example is Amer al-Sa‘adi, 
an Iraqi scientist who became famous before the war for denying, ac-
curately, that Iraq had any weapons of mass destruction (WMD). An-
ticipating a quick release once Iraq’s lack of WMD became known, Dr. 
al-Sa‘adi turned himself in to US forces immediately after Baghdad’s 
fall. He remains in detention, and repeated calls for his release through 
an international petition drive led by his German wife, who survived 
the August 2003 Canal Hotel bombing while arguing his case to UN 
officials, have to date failed to sway US authorities. 
In addition to the physical damage endured in the wave of looting 
and the staff depletion caused by Bremer’s decree and other US ac-
tions, the universities have faced serious issues of campus and personal 
security. Since March 2003, at least 200 academics have faced violent 
attacks, the fate of 75 kidnapped instructors remains unknown, and at 
least 14 professors have been murdered in a targeted fashion. In light 
of such danger, it should come as no surprise that an estimated 1,600- 
2,000 university instructors have left the country.7 Those professors re-
maining behind have been obliged to face the inevitable politicization 
of campus life that followed the collapse of a system designed to care-
fully channel political energies towards centrally-mandated goals for 
more than a generation. Campuses quickly became arenas for intense 
political competition between groups affiliated with various factions of 
the Iraqi political scene. While public political discussion was a welcome 
change for many in the new order, such politicization has proved dis-
ruptive to campus civility and intimidated many. A recent academic visi-
tor from Jordan was warned against visiting campuses because there 
were “spies” who might inform on the stranger’s presence. 
Against all odds, Iraq’s university staff carries on: physical plants have 
been repaired, new structures of institutional 
governance have been established, and library 
collections have been re-organized with the addi-
tion of some book shipments. However, such ac-
tivities continue in the face of a shoestring budg-
et, meagre international support, and a myriad of 
security problems. The combination of staff short-
fall and financial constraints has grown so dire in 
recent months that 134 Ph.D. programmes have 
been eliminated throughout the university sys-
tem.8 As a sign of just how precarious the security 
situation has become for government officials, 
the Ministry of Education was hit by a car bomb 
in the first week of November 2004. In light of all 
the obstacles, in some sense it is remarkable that 
higher education continues at all in Iraq. The fact 
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